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lain McCalman and Ann McGrath 
Visitors to the National Museum of Australia's repository can 
encounter a crazy mechanical sculpture, entitled 'The Law Machine', 
constructed by political cartoonist Bruce Petty. 1 A distinctive 
lawyer's wig, copperplate writing on wood, antique money, musi-
cal instrum.ents, knives, forks and a range of old and new everyday 
objects are loosely assembled into an anthropomorphic machine 
evoking centuries-old traditions. When the handle of this unique 
apparatus is turned, the adversarial system pits defence against pros-
ecution to process money, persuasion, judgement, penalties and hu-
man rights in an apparently random fashion. Consuming at the wig 
end and excreting jurisprudential outcomes at the other, Petty's Law 
Machine satirises the legal system's unclear logic and the icons of 
its authority. 
Jn Proof & Truth: The Humanist as Expert, humanists, legal 
scholars and practitioners inquire into the complex workings of the 
real law machine in relation to the sometimes incompatible exper-
tise of lawyers and humanists. Legal experts are, by nature, 'at 
home' with the mechanics of the judicial system and in tune with its 
logic and priorities. This is not necessarily the case for historians, 
anthropologists and other humanist experts. For them, the unfamil-
iar judicial terrain can be confusing and difficult to navigate. Yet 
humanist scholars and lawyers are alike in their concern with proof 
and truth; they share a passion in seeking these two holy grails. 
However, as many of the contributors in this collection demonstrate, 
lawyers and scholars can have quite different understandings of these 
core ideals of 'proof' and 'truth'. 
This book explores, first, how these fundamental terms operate 
as distinctive concepts in the historically evolving contexts of the 
courtroom and the academy. And, perhaps more importantly, what 
happens when the two approaches collide - when a human~st ap-
pears as an expert witness in a court of law. As many of the cases 
discussed in the following chapters reveal, 'collision' is an apt word 
for these encounters are often mutually problematic. The lawyer's 
'facts' do not necessarily sit comfortably with the scholar's 'truths'. 
The finely-tuned arguments and scholarly findings of the humanist 
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can seem impossibly slippery when uprooted from their normal con-
text and proffered as evidence in the courtroom. With reference to 
many colourful, well-known and sometimes landmark legal cases, 
our collection aims to elucidate the weak spots and incongruities 
between the law and the humanities and, it is hoped, to point the 
way to a set of practices that will enhance the truth-seeking values 
and missions of both professions. 
Whether located in Europe or the British diaspora, the law and 
the humanities are two very different intellectual frameworks, with 
disparate functions, purposes and cultures. The law and its practi-
tioners go about ascertaining 'truth' and 'proof' according to a long 
western tradition and specific precedents. Similarly, humanities 
scholars are essentially concerned with 'truth' and its indicators, 
the 'proof'. In this volume we often refer to humanities scholars as 
'humanists' to remind ourselves that the disciplines arise out of a 
long European humanist tradition and concern human society and 
action. 
Apparent similarities between the law and the humanities can be 
deceptive. Deploying common terms such as 'truth', 'proof' and 
'evidence', each group mistakenly and confusingly assumes shared 
meanings. Rarely do they engage with each other about how the 
conditions of usage, institutional aims and traditions can prove to 
be poor matches. Consequently, when legal cases or related enqui-
ries demand that lawyers and humanists work together, they often 
operate at cross-purposes, without any means of satisfactory com-
munication, let alone a useful level of mutual insight and under-
standing. 
Definitions of 'proof ' and 'truth' differ with changing 
cosmologies, times and cultures. In a rationalist age, ' truth' had a 
particular reliance upon tangible 'proof', whereas in a more reli-
gious age, 'truth' relied upon authenticated interpretations of reli-
gious 'reality'. In a scientific era, the methods of 'proof' rely on the 
latest digital technologies, forensic and medical experiments. But 
no era is without its controversies and contestations over truth. The 
twenty-first century remains an era where humanists are making 
greater efforts to move away from Eurocentrism towards cross-cul-
tural understandings. In such scholarship, 'truth' exists in multiples 
rather than a singular unit. In other words, the 'whole truth' might 
not exist as one. 
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Post-modem critiques have challenged the universality of 'truth' 
and 'relativism': different cross-cultural, gendered and other per-
spectives are increasingly accepted amongst scholars and amongst 
the public at large. New legal scholarship also embraces such frame-
works. While the foundations of humanist 'truth-claims' have been 
significantly shaken, the foundations of the courts ' 'truth-claims' 
would appear to be holding firm. But are they? Possibly the law has 
always been more sceptical and careful about its fallibility in ascer-
taining truth. 
Proof & Truth: The Humanist as Expert provides a forum for 
practitioners and scholars in the law and the humanities to come 
together to engage in a potentially enlightening - if not reforming 
- dialogue. This collection owes its origins to the Australian Acad-
emy of the Humanities' annual symposium oflate 2002. The need 
for such a forum was originally inspired by a panel on native title at 
an Australian Historians' Association Conference in Adelaide in late 
2000, which grew into a wider discussion about the status of the 
discipline of history as a field of 'expertise' as defined by the courts.2 
The President of the Academy, Iain McCalman, and Ann 
McGrath, then the Director of the Society and Nation program at 
the National Museum of Australia, were invited to act as co-
convenors of the forum. For McGrath, her first-hand experience as 
an expert witness in Northern Territory Aboriginal Land Claims, 3 in 
Gunner & Cubillo v the Commonwealth of Australia (a federal test 
case for the stolen children), and her role as History Coordinator of 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, raised a 
range of pressing questions relating to humanities scholarship and 
the law. Professor Iain McCalman extended the program's param-
eters to mould a symposium that would attempt to confront the widest 
issues facing the humanist disciplines today, encouraging compara-
tive reflection upon the intersections between the law and different 
genres ofhumanist expertise, including philosophy, psychology, and 
the sciences. 
Humanist scholars have a range of venues in which they practise 
their respective disciplines, where they may inform and influence 
the wider society, including the judges and lawyers serving in the 
courts. They publish in scholarly journals or popular magazines; 
they write books and debate issues at conferences. They give lec-
tures and conduct seminars for students and they engage in public 
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forums, write opinion pieces in newspapers, serve on committees, 
shape or criticise government policy and participate in radio, televi-
sion, film, digital, multi-media and museum exhibitions. In venues 
where there is less autonomy, fewer senior humanists are to be found. 
Rightly or wrongly, they fear that the integrity of their work may be 
jeopardised by oversimplifications, conflicts of interest or external 
pressures. Unfortunately, the courts loom large in this regard. Hu-
manists who act as experts often feel that they are subjected to ex-
ceptional efforts to discredit the epistemological bases of their pro-
fessional disciplines. When first approached by a lawyer to appear 
in a court-case, many humanities scholars jump at the opportunity, 
but after a brutal 'blooding' in the witness box they rarely repeat the 
experience. 
The courts are immensely influential, if not hegemonic venues 
in western society. They are arbiters of justice that not only punish 
but also redistribute wealth and enlarge or qualify individual and 
collective rights and freedoms. If humanists are serious about pub-
lic outreach beyond the academy, they should be exploring ways in 
which they can make more useful and well-targeted contributions 
towards informing the courts. If lawyers are serious about getting 
the best proof and getting as close as they can to the truth, we be-
lieve they should consider better ways to work with humanist ex-
perts and humanities expertise. In Proof & Truth we explore the 
cultural and performative venues of the courts and consider both 
who and what should be changing - the humanists, the lawyers, or 
the court system itself. 
In recent times, a number of socially significant cases have chal-
lenged the preconceptions and disciplinary parameters of humani-
ties scholars, and have challenged the courts equally. Cases relating 
to indigenous peoples who occupied lands prior to the arrival of 
British law pose special difficulties not only to Australian and inter-
national jurisprudence but also to humanities scholars, whose disci-
plines are often imbued with Western and imperial associations. The 
High Court's Mabo judgment in 1992 overturned previous rulings, 
such as the Blackbum Judgment, and ruled that native title rights 
existed for Indigenous Australians. In overturning the doctrine of 
terra nullius, Mabo effectively rewrote Australian history. 
Such judgments indirectly drew upon new humanities scholar-
ship, most particularly the pioneering work of Henry Reynolds. 
When the legal scholar Garth Nettheim of the University of New 
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South Wales convened a meeting of the legal fraternity to hear 
Reynolds ' latest, then unpublished, historical findings, more than 
one senior lawyer accused him of not understanding the law. 
Reynolds' well-publicised book Law of the Land (1987) directly 
and convincingly challenged legal decisions on Indigenous land 
ownership, asserting these were based upon false premises about 
the history of British law, colonialism and governance. 4 In 1992, in 
the wake of the Mabo decision and post-modernism's questioning 
of ' truth' , Reynolds urged historians to forget their 'epistemologi-
cal angst' and assert in the courts the authority of their discipline, 
with its powerful truth claims. Over the next 11 years, history as a 
profession has, however, been subdued in its participation in the 
native title process, leaving most of the work to anthropologists. 
Despite this, it is no coincidence that high-profile scholars oflndig-
enous history have been subjected to well-publicised questioning 
in regard to historical facts and political allegiances and how they 
affect the proof and the truth. 
Being about engagement with the human, humanities studies are 
enterprises requiring passion and imagination, and they are often 
driven by a commitment to justice. 'Subjectivity' versus 'objectiv-
ity' can therefore be called into question, just as - in the sphere of 
the law - can the distinction between 'expert opinion' and judge-
ment, the realm of judge or jury. While in the law, ' subjectivity' is 
equated with partisanship, in the humanities this is not necessarily 
the case, because elements of subjectivity that permeate selection 
and interpretation are viewed as inevitable and, when properly con-
trolled, even potentially enriching. Hence 'reflexivity' or reflecting 
upon the author's predispositions and methodologies has been ac-
cepted by many, though not all, h'umanists. 
The humanities itself is a broad church, including such disci-
plines as anthropology, musicology, politics, sociology, psychol-
ogy, history, and other disciplines that might simultaneously be 
classed as ' social sciences' . Generally the humanities encompass 
the disciplines concerned with researching, analysing and interpret-
ing various facets of the human condition. Theoretical insights, logi-
cal argument, evidence and narrative combine· to establish 'proof' 
and ' truth' . Yet while humani sts may be authoritative on themselves 
and their field of expertise, they are sometimes not so adept at ar-
ticulating and defending these when on alien turf - and they can 
fail spectacularly when doing so in court. 
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Law also ranges broadly, and divergent styles of practice have 
been adopted between civil law, criminal Jaw, and between tribu-
nals such as land claims and native title. Styles of practice also vary 
between individual practitioners. The same holds true of human-
ists. While traditions in both spheres may shape present practice, 
each discipline and each court is also subject to change over time 
and to pragmatic modifications designed to meet new kinds of cases 
and examples. The power of sharp debate, convincing logic and 
'irrefutable' facts combine with a reliance upon a performative mix 
of the spoken and the written word governed by rules of evidence. 
Both fields rely on 'precedents' - just as humanists draw on previ-
ous scholarship to shape their facts and conclusions, so lawyers rely 
on earlier arguments and judgements to build new cases. 
So, while proof and truth continue to constitute the bedrock of 
both the law and the humanities, their geomorphology is often frac-
tured and unstable. The law and humanities are both fields of en-
quiry that seek evidence from which to make a judgement. How-
ever, the paths they take towards this end tend to diverge. The meth-
ods, processes and techniques used to arrive at 'proof' and their 
purposes in ascertaining ' truth' are distinct. 
In this collection, Proof & Truth: The Humanist as Expert, each 
chapter grapples with the nature and relations between proof, truth, 
law and humanities in distinctive, often path-breaking ways, pro-
viding a wide range of perspectives and including a diversity of 
practical experience and disciplinary knowledge and expertise. Our 
book is divided into four main sections: the Humanities and the 
Law; History on Trial; Truth, Facts and Memory; Truth and Institu-
tions. 
The first two chapters provide broad-ranging surveys of the na-
ture and relationship of the law and the humanities. Locating hu-
manists and lawyers as natural allies in a quest for justice, Hal 
Wootten QC offers a magisterial and incisive overview. Differenti-
ating the humanities from the law, which he classifies as a 'profes-
sion' or practical vocation, he argues that the professions not only 
require specific skills, but also hold special responsibilities beyond 
those of the humanities. Wootten contends that while the law is in-
deed committed to finding 'the truth', its duty to finalise disputes 
provides limited time for its truth quests. Furthermore, the courts 
privilege procedural justice above the search for truth. The expert 
witness's evidence must be subjected to tests to hold up to the bur-
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den of proof and conform to the rules of evidence. While rejecting 
any attack on empiricist and rationalist thinking within legal frame-
works and dispute settling, he acknowledges that the rules of the 
court are under continuing criticism, review and amendment. 
Wootten acknowledges the significant involvement of humanities 
scholars from anthropology, linguistics, history and archaeology in 
recent cases relating to the treatment of Indigenous people, and he 
recognizes the understandable dissatisfaction of such experts. Ar-
guing that the problems lie not with the legal procedures but with 
the structural framework - the nature of dispute settling and the 
laws themselves - he proffers some positive alternatives, includ-
ing more appropriate forums for deciding redress. 
Historian Graeme Davison describes lawyers and historians as 
' intellectual cousins'. Indeed, Marc Bloch, one oftheAnnales School 
founders, thought of the historian's role as similar to a 'grumpy 
examining magistrate' relentlessly cross-examining witnesses. While 
Bloch also pointed out that the scholar's role was 'understanding' 
and the lawyer's was 'justice', Davison explains how history and 
law often overlap, such as in investigations ofNazi war crimes. He 
offers a range of insights from the Mabo judgement, Gunner & 
Cubillo, the Waitangi tribunal (Aoteoroa/New Zealand), the Sears 
Roebuck case before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion case in the United States and that of holocaust denier David 
Irving. Drawing on such examples, Davison evaluates the weightings 
of ' facts' and 'judgement', advocacy and expertise that might con-
front a historian in the court. Concluding that the law is more about 
civil order than eliciting truth or imaginatively exploring the hu-
man condition, he contends that the historian in pursuit of common 
political or moral goals must play oy the lawyer's rules. Wootten 
and Davison both discuss the limitations of historical practice in the 
courts and agree that adopting relativist views will not make ex-
perts helpful in court. 
Section Two opens with lawyer Mark Dreyfus QC examining 
the experience of historians in court - still a relatively rare occur-
rence in Australian litigation. He provides valuable summaries of a 
range of judgements concerning the use of historical expertise in 
courts, most particularly Gunner & Cubillo and various Australian 
native title cases. He also considers the implications of a libel ac-
tion by British historian David Irving against American historian 
Deborah Lipstadt and her publisher. Elucidating the tensions be-
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tween historical and legal method, he concludes that historians in 
court will always be in an environment structured to be essentially 
unreceptive to their methods. However, in contexts that test histori-
cal issues of 'truth and lies', he believes the courts can function as a 
very public vehicle for this truth telling. 
Historian Ann Curthoys and legal scholar and historian Ann 
Genovese investigate why historians have been 'having a hard time 
in court', and engage with Dreyfus on the role of humanists in the 
Gunner & Cubillo and native title cases before inspecting another 
case, Edwina Shaw & Anor v Charles Wolf & Ors (1998) which 
involved a court ruling on Indigenous identity. The latter leads them 
to a consideration of'basal facts' for a judge versus the role of'facts' 
for a historian engaged in humanistic, narrative-based rather than 
scientifically-based practices. They conclude that their interdisci-
plinary methodology should help clarify what happens when 
history 's narratives are on trial and become rewritten as law's sto-
ries. 
Economic historian Arthur Ray uses his knowledge of indig-
enous cases in Canada and the United States to make comparisons 
with relevant Australian examples, thereby qualifying some of our 
assumptions about the incompatibility of disciplines like history and 
the law. He explains how the Canadian courts, and academic disci-
plines such as anthropology and history, have not only found ways 
to work together but have also mutually influenced each other 
through the process. The Canadian courts have also formally inte-
grated the presenting of indigenous evidence into their structures. 
Covering the lengthy time span between 1946 and 2002, Ray dem-
onstrates how title claims in United States, Australian and Cana-
dian litigation have raised challenging questions relating to hear-
say, voice, research, and evidence, especially regarding the prac-
tices of anthropology and history. In the Canadian case, he con-
tends that the courts do not have a problem recognizsing the rel-
evance of history and working closely with historians in the courts. 
Only historical understanding, for example, can explain how 'tradi-
tion' might be measured for the Meti people, whose communities 
grew out of nineteenth century unions between the French and En-
glish fur traders and indigenous women. Ray also discusses ways 
that Indigenous perspectives have been incorporated in Canadian 
court hearings. By providing concrete examples of change being 
effected within the courts, Ray challenges the sceptics who might 
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assert that the legal system is immobile and intransigent. More sur-
prisingly to an Australian audience, the Canadian courts have wel-
comed opportunities to evaluate in detail the different approaches 
of various branches or practices of history. 
By contrast, in Section Three legal scholar Arthur Glass is par-
ticularly sceptical of the capacities of history to resolve legal dis-
putes: 'There are some things that law rightly treats as irrelevant', 
he argues. History, he implies, might appear too general for law, 
because the latter must focus on the specific. Nevertheless, he con-
cedes that historians can sometimes assert influence by 'assembling 
primary factual material' or explaining why the past should be un-
derstood in a particular way. However, historians would do well to 
agree to have their ideas evaluated by a non-historian. Arguing that 
the Yorta Yorta judgment will have a profound effect upon the type 
of historical evidence relevant to native title claims, he considers 
the High Court rulings that tackled concepts of tradition, change 
and continuity without necessarily being informed by the larger rel-
evant intellectual context or literature. He exhorts that when histo-
rians have persuasive arguments, they should try to change judicial 
thinking by presenting them in socially influential contexts outside 
the courtroom. 
Legal scholar Anthony Connolly also gently rebukes exponents 
of the humanities for their naivete and misunderstanding of the 
courts. He suggests that humanists do not properly understand their 
expert function in the courts, particularly when they use their time 
as expert witnesses to lobby for change in how the law treats them. 
In order to refashion the legal process, humanists must learn to ar-
gue persuasively for their own legitimacy. In the public sphere and 
a range of venues outside the coutts, humanists need to provide 
convincing arguments about how and why they can be useful. He 
emphasises that the legal system is grounded upon general rules 
designed to apply to 'objectively determinable factual situations'. 
Disputes are thus over the facts of the matter. The trial serves as a 
space of authoritative if not socially useful storytelling but it is es-
sential to the court process that the testimony and evidence of the 
witness be carefully regulated. He concludes overall that the scien-
tific disciplines are simply better matched to the court's purposes 
and practices. 
Taking an opposing perspective, Justice K. J. Crispin argues that 
we cannot assume clear-cut distinctions between the veracity of the 
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sciences compared to the humanities. Citing a case where four or-
thopaedic surgeons all arrived at different measurements of the one 
man's legs, Crispin demonstrates how evidence is always reliant 
upon interpretation. Drawing upon a wide range of cases reliant 
upon scientific evidence, he concedes that cross-examination tech-
niques are often not a helpful method of presenting complex data. 
Advances within any discipline - for example the forensic advances 
since the Lindy Chamberlain case - can overturn previous expert 
opinion. Swnmarising the problems that expert witnesses can hold 
for juries and judges, he notes that little study has been conducted 
on how juries might respond or how juries work more generally. 
While neither science nor law can claim to have eradicated human 
fallibility, as Hal Wootten, Mark Finnane and others have demon-
strated, error can lead to grave injustice and heavy consequences. 
Consequently Crispin concludes that the system and individuals 
within it should be vigilant in the quest for humanity, humanist val-
ues and aspirations to reach the truth. 
John Sutton, a philosopher of psychology and history of science, 
poses searching questions concerning memory and truth, thus ques-
tioning the legal reliance on firsthand testimony as opposed to ex-
pert testimony. Drawing upon developmental and cognitive psy-
chology, Sutton examines some causes of error and distortion within 
memory processes and considers the contestability and lack of uni-
formity in memory. Although not altogether dismissing the value or 
reliability of a witness 's memory, Sutton argues that new insights 
from psychology certainly challenge the common sense assump-
tions of 'automatic epistemological privileges for memory' . He re-
minds us that the authority of memory is socially and legally 
contextualised, and always either boosted or compromised by its fit 
with other relevant beliefs. 
Law Professor Larissa Behrendt examines from an Indigenous 
perspective the deep-seated coloniser narratives that shape the think-
ing of Australian courts, especially the mythologised case of Eliza 
Fraser. Captivity narratives, where white women must be saved from 
'degradation' or 'a fate worse than death' at the hands ofblack male 
'savages', were widely circulated and eagerly read by colonizsers 
throughout North America and Australia. Behrendt argues that, left 
unquestioned, such narratives of nation continue to sustain warped 
understandings and bias towards cases involving the sexual assault 
of black women. Colonising narratives thus subtly and relentlessly 
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inform contemporary judgements concerning Indigenous individu-
als and their culture. Here we see how the subjective underlying 
processes of historical formation can eventually become legal bed-
rock. 
Historian of law and institutions Mark Finnane explores enqui-
ries into truth, offering insights into the history of the management 
of truth and its consequences. Focusing upon the cases of people 
who live administered lives, such as those in mental hospitals or 
prisons, he raises challenging problems about the relations between 
public and private, openness and secrecy, privacy, disclosure and 
confidentiality. First referring to the notorious case of Rupert Max 
Stuart, Finnane provides a detailed examination of the complex in-
fluences of racism and institutionalisation on Vincent Roy Ryan, 
who died in custody and whose case was investigated by the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Humanists, Finnane 
concludes, do not merely gather facts but can apply 'research ques-
tions and methodologies that throw light into dark places'. Suggest-
ing a dual role for humanists as both advocates and scholars, Finnane 
argues that unless an individual or group happens to have dedicated 
advocates to their cause, and unless societal structures allow truth 
to become contestable, the inhabitants of closed institutions do not 
in fact benefit from privacy controls, but become its victims. The 
humanist scholar can enable us to distinguish past and present insti-
tutional and cultural contexts as well as the ends we seek in pro-
claiming truth. 
Proof & Truth: the Humanist as Expert aspires to reach practi-
tioners of law, scholars of law, humanities scholars, scientists and 
those who believe in humanism, or the potential for improvement 
ofhuman societies. In this way we m'ay help to shift the terms of the 
debate and to begin to provide some convincing critiques and ra-
tionales for ensuring a more constructive, informed and informa-
tive role for humanists in the courts. 
Unlike Petty's rather fragile and easily modified law machine, 
the common view is that legal institutions are (or should be) immo-
bile and unchanging. But these cornerstones of our social and po-
litical order emanate from human endeavour and reflect a humanist 
aspiration to justice. They can thus never be immobile. Although 
the cogs of justice may tum slowly, we believe the courtroom and 
its practices will always be malleable to constructive humanist in-
put as long as we are prepared to crank the handles. Finally, we 
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hope that this collection will lay a foundation for future exchanges 
and more substantial collaborations in our respective quests for proof 
and truth. 
Notes 
1 Bruce Petty's Law Machine is in the collection of the National Museum 
of Australia. 
2 M. Paul and G. Gray, Through a Smoky Mirror: History and Native Title 
(Canberra: AIATSIS, 2002). 
3 See two 'precursor' papers by Ann McGrath, pp. 229-264. 
4 Henry Reynolds, Law of the Land (Ringwood: Penguin, 1987). 
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